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2. They are independent of a man's religious and theological beliefs;

3. Material resources, political changes, social institutions are valuable only so far as they contribute to the moral well-being of the community.

He goes on to indicate more nearly the position of such Societies by drawing the line between them and Churches, Halls of Science, and Socialistic Associations. For an Ethical Society, Goodness, the Moral Law, is a law of Nature, not any supernaturally revealed code of rules. We are supposed thus to place Morality upon a firm and immutable foundation. Further, the aim of such a Society is practical as well as theoretical. Professor Muirhead advocates what he calls "intra-mundane" (or pantheistic) as distinct from "supra-mundane" theism, and Christianity, regarded as an embodiment of the "great constructive ideas" which we owe to Christ, and after him to St. Paul and St. John. Similarly he does not disclaim Socialism of the kind which aims at transforming primarily the sentiments and habits of the people. Finally Professor Muirhead holds that Ethical Societies ought to concern themselves both with *ideas about Morality* (including—as Mr. Leslie Stephen also would do—consideration of ethical "first principles"), and likewise with *moral ideas*, and practical sympathy and fellowship—offering a "common ground of work and hope" to those who have ceased to find in current creeds and churches moral support and companionship.

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INTERPRETATIONS OF POETRY AND RELIGION. By George Santayana. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900. Pp. x, 290.

It is not easy to summarize the contents of this remarkable book—as remarkable for the beauty and distinction of the style in which it is written as for its order of ideas. The central thought is that of the essential identity of poetry and religion. Poetry deals with imaginative conceptions, and religion is poetry taken to heart, believed in and applied to life. The error of religion is in pretending to deal with matters of fact. It brings itself thereby into conflict with science, and moreover soils its own purity—for its proper concern is to express the ideal. "Its function is to draw from reality materials for an image of that ideal to which reality

ought to conform, and to make us citizens, in anticipation, in the world we crave" (p. vi). The actual world is a somewhat sorry scheme in the author's eyes; he speaks, with apparent sympathy, of a certain writer's "passionate pessimism about the natural world," even of "the speculative pessimism inevitable to an intelligent being," and says, "That Nature is immense, that her laws are mechanical, that the existence and well-being of man upon earth are, from the point of view of the universe, an indifferent incident,—all this is in the first place to be clearly recognized" (chap. ix). Yet man to whom Nature is thus indifferent can also turn his back on Nature and care for her only as she fosters the free life of his mind and imagination. He is apparently, in the author's eyes, a plus in relation to his phenomenal antecedents, and in reacting on his environment gives back more than he receives. He conceives the "light that never was on land or sea," and on slight hints from nature pictures bright and beautiful gods, and with scant warrant from history fashions social ideals. He raises, too, searching questions overtopping the power of his experience to answer—so that he ventures beyond what "the understanding, with its present resources," can give in framing replies. "The imagination, therefore, must furnish to religion and to metaphysics those large ideas tintured with passion, those supersensible forms shrouded in awe, in which alone a mind of great sweep and vitality can find its congenial objects" (p. 6). It is by such imaginative effort that wholes are made of these sorry fragments we call our life. Ideas and ideals are the complements by which experience is rounded out. The otherwise incomplete, trivial or even empty hence gets a meaning; a standard of value, a "principle of correction," becomes fixed; and a goal is set for our life—or even, as Aristotle thought, for all nature. To worship nature, *i. e.*, the world we know, is consequently impossible, and for natural religion, ancient or modern, the author has little praise; the true objects of religion are "supernatural"—"ultra-mundane" is the phrase used in an admiring account of the Aristotelian conception of God. Man himself is above nature, and above man is only the ideal world, the world of "immortal forms." But the ideal is not to be objectified, natural as it may be to do so in certain stages of culture. "Existence," the author reminds us with delightful frankness, "is something quite irrelevant to an ideal" (p. 72).

In harmony with this view, which finds a semi-formal statement

in the opening and concluding chapters of the book, Professor Santayana gives us fascinating studies of the Greek religion and of the Christian system ("The Homeric Hymns," "The Dissolution of Paganism," "The Poetry of Christian Dogma"), keen criticisms of Shakespeare ("The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare") and of Whitman and Browning ("The Poetry of Barbarism"), and a sympathetic account of a certain contemporary Frenchman's reconstruction of religion in harmony with modern conditions of thought ("A Religion of Disillusion"—the reference being to Jean Lahor's "La gloire du néant").

Possibly owing to the literary rather than philosophical form of the book, varying standpoints seem to be taken at different times, which may puzzle even an attentive reader—or, perhaps we should say, *only* an attentive reader, since the charm and flow of the style, and the luminousness of each thought by itself, tend to make one oblivious to aught else. For instance, the ideal is spoken of as something "to which reality ought to conform," and the general attitude to reality might be called a quite disdainful one. We hear of the "niggardliness of Nature," and of the "irrational forces" amid which we live (p. 100). Yet in another connection the "laws of the world" are spoken of as "fixed and unchangeable conditions of our happiness" (p. 240), and Nature appears as a "temple," even as a "house of prayer" (p. 22). These different attitudes may be reconcilable, but they are hardly reconciled. Again, the author speaks of the ideal constructions of religion and metaphysics as possibly true (p. 7); but if so, they are ideal in a different sense from that in which the ideal is a standard for reality—they may be reality. In the same way poetry, though contrasted with science, is spoken of as "an approach to the highest reality" (p. 289). Evidently there are different senses of "reality" and different senses of the "ideal"—and they are not clearly distinguished. Still further the view of religion varies. In general its objects are ideal, supernatural—the natural becomes divine only as it is transfigured into the human or superhuman (see particularly pp. 64, 65); yet in Greek tragedy, the religiousness of which is dwelt upon, the dominant ideas noted are such naturalistic conceptions as fate, and the eternity of nature and law (pp. 157, 158). He speaks, too, with sympathy of the idea of "a cosmic order, of general laws of life," and "of an impersonal religion" (p. 283); indeed, "an austere and impersonal religion" would appear, in one passage, to be the highest type (p. 197). It is

evident that one must be careful in drawing inferences from single statements of the author—even repeated ones. The ideal itself, which is at times so sharply contrasted with reality, is after all, if we may accept Jean Lahor's view as the author's own, "a function of reality" (p. 246), and may be destined—at least ideals in society, art and science—to become reality; nay, in some hardly-to-be-defined sense may be reality (pp. 7, 289). Moreover, how can ideals be distinguished from the "illusions" which the author reprobates (p. 250), save as they fit into the possible conditions of reality? Somehow, as he is quite aware, terms must be made with reality, else his idealistic view is in danger of passing into "a mere idealism"—of becoming, like the later Greek mythology, not "a natural interpretation" of the facts of life, but "an artificial addition to them" (p. 57). A philosophical statement of his position those interested in this rare and beautiful book would welcome.

As to the present religious outlook, we are hardly in error in thinking that though as between orthodox and liberal religion the author would prefer the former as richer in content (pp. vi, vii), and is fearful about the immediate future (p. 116), his real interests are with those who are trying in some such manner as Jean Lahor to work out, in theory and practice, a purified idealism. Of the liberal school he says, "Mythology cannot become science by being reduced in bulk, but it may cease, as a mythology, to be worth having"—which reminds one of Matthew Arnold's thrust at the "dead horses" of natural theology. But to do without mythology altogether would seem to be the highest thing to his mind. The closing paragraph of the chapter entitled "A Religion of Disillusion" is as follows:

"We cannot change the world, even if we boast to have made it [this after arguing that "to subjectify the unwise is not to improve it, much less to dissolve it"]; we must in any case learn to live with it, whether it be our parent or our child. To veil its character with euphemisms or to supply its defects with superstitious assumptions is a course unworthy of a brave man and abhorrent to a prudent one. What we should do is to make a modest inventory of our possessions or a just estimate of our powers in order to apply both, with what strength we have, to the realization of our ideals in society, in art, and in science. These will constitute our Cosmos. In building it—for there is none other that builds it for us—we shall be carrying on the work of the only race that has yet seriously attempted to live rationally, the race to which we owe the name and the idea of a Cosmos, as well as the beginnings of its realization. We shall then be making that rare advance in wisdom which consists in abandoning our illusions the better to attain our ideals."

We shall do a service to our readers in calling their attention to two little books of poetry by Professor Santayana: "Sonnets and Other Poems" (1894), and "Lucifer, a Theological Drama" (1899), both published by Herbert S. Stone & Co., Chicago. They will find in them much of the same union of elevated thought with refined literary form. We quote one passage:

"For long ago I taught my thoughts to run
Where all the great things live that lived of yore,
And in eternal quiet float and soar;
There all my loves are gathered into one,
Where change is not, nor parting any more,
Nor revolution of the moon and sun."

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

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LA MORALE UTILITARIA DELLO STUART MILL. Esposizione della Dottrina. Memoria del S. C. Prof. Giuseppe Zuccante. Milano, 1899. Quarto. Pp. 113.

In this Memoir, which forms part of the proceedings of the Lombard Royal Academy of Science and Literature, Dr. Zuccante continues the study of English hedonism which he began in the monographs reviewed in the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS* for January, 1899. [Vol. IX., p. 236]. The present work is the third of a series which he is devoting to the theory of J. S. Mill. In two earlier pamphlets Dr. Zuccante discussed the origin of Mill's ethics, he now expounds the doctrine itself, and in a future work he intends to criticise it. Even in this memoir, however, there is a good deal of criticism, and elaborate comparisons are made between the views of Mill and those of Mr. Spencer, Professor Bain and others. The main substance of the volume is a very elaborate exposition of Mill's "Utilitarianism," and in addition there is much quotation and discussion of the passages bearing on ethics in the "Logic," the "Examination of Hamilton" and the "Dissertations and Discussions." Apparently there is no Italian translation of the "Utilitarianism," and Dr. Zuccante's work will be useful as a substitute. He refers frequently to Le Monnier's French translation, mainly to point out its errors, and his own renderings seem to me to be almost always accurate. The only exceptions are such slight errors as that on p. 61, l. 25, where the point of the English sentence is lost, viz., that the tax should not merely be in proportion to the amount of a man's possessions,